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More than half of German adults are overweight. Those most often affected include 
the elderly, poor, and individuals with poor education. Yet is overweight an issue that 
economists should address?
Poor nutrition and lack of exercise play a major role in widespread diseases. One-
third of total health care expenditures are devoted to illnesses related to overweight. 
This is just one of the reasons why economists should examine how to promote more 
health-conscious nutritional decisions.
One instrument favored by policy makers in this regard is nutrition labelling. At 
present, manufacturers display nutritional information on food packaging on a 
voluntary basis and in a non-standardised format. This is supposed to change. In the 
near future, the European Parliament will convene to debate the standardisation of 
nutritional information. 
How food labelling regulations should be designed remains a subject of controversy, 
however. There are essentially two models to choose from: the EU Commission 
prefers a system in which the recommended daily values for each dietary component 
would be indicated as a percentage, without the use of a color-coded classification 
system. By contrast, consumer and health care organisations prefer a traffic light 
model, with red, yellow, and green lights to indicate nutrient levels in a particular 
food. Against this backdrop, the present article examines the following question: Is 
there an empirical or theoretical basis for favoring one of these labelling systems 
in light of consumer and health-care policy objectives? 
The key finding of this article is that there is no clear empirical justification for 
discarding either of the two models. However, explanatory approaches based upon 
information and behavioural economics indicate that the traffic light model has 
some clear advantages, primarily because consumers are only able to assimilate a 
limited amount of information basis when making purchase decisions. 
Several years ago, the European Commission began working to revise regulations 
related to food labelling. The motivation for action in this area was the lack of a 





related components of packaged food. The EU 
Commission first conducted an evaluation of food 
labelling regulations and tried to ascertain how con-
sumers would prefer to be informed about foods (see 
Box). In 2006, the European Commission passed 
a regulation concerning nutritional information in 
foodstuffs. And in 2008, the Commission presented 
a proposal for the consolidation and harmonisation 
of food labelling regulations. 
The regulation calls for mandatory nutritional label-
ling based on unified criteria at the European level. 
This requirement is to apply to all levels of the food 
supply chain and to all packaged foods that go to 
end consumers, restaurants, or to establishments 
with communal dining (such as schools, hospitals, 
and canteens). 
The EU Commission is pursuing a number of goals 
in its harmonisation program: From the perspec-
tive of competition policy it aims to improve the 
free exchange of goods in the domestic market and 
strengthen competition in the food sector. In terms 
of nutritional and health policy, the goal is for con-
sumers to nourish themselves in a healthier and more 
balanced way (see Dossier). An additional aim of 
the new labelling is to encourage the consumption 
of individual dietary components in accordance with 
scientific recommendations for healthy nutrition.1 
The consumer policy goals for mandatory nutritional 
labelling are to protect consumers from mislead-
ing information, to create transparency about food 
quality with respect to dietary components, and to 
provide help to consumers in making comparative 
choices based upon health considerations.  
1  This aim is stated in general guidelines for nutritional information 
passed in 1991 at an international level (Codex Alimentarius) as well 
as in the guidelines for nutrition-related information that have been in 
place since 1997.
Box
Selected European Union initiatives 
regarding food and nutritional content 
labelling
2005:
Release  of  the  EU  Commission  Green  Paper  titled 
“Promotion of healthy diets and physical activity: a 
European dimension for the prevention of overweight, 
obesity and chronic illnesses.”  ec.europa.eu/health/
ph_determinants/life_style/nutrition/green_paper/
consultation_en.htm.
A European consultation procedure began with the in-
troduction with the Green Paper. The current goal is to 
reverse the trend towards overweight by 2015 at the 
latest. Alongside improved consumer information, the EU 
is promoting increased innovation in the food industry 
as well as improved food recipes and nutritional content 
from a health perspective.
2006:
The  following  legislation  was  passed  in  2006:  EC 
Regulation No. 1924/2006 of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 20 December 2006 on nutrition 
and health claims made on foods; as well as European 
Commission Health Claim Directive 2006/142/EC of 
22 December 2006 amending Annex IIIa of Directive 
2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council listing of ingredients which must under all cir-
cumstances appear on labelling of food labels. 
2007:
European Commission White Paper: A Strategy for 
Europe on Nutrition, Overweight, and Obesity Related 
Health Issues. COM(2007), 279 final (SEC 2007) 706, 
SEC (2007) 707. 
2008:
EU Commission: Proposal for a regulation from the 
European Parliament and Council on the provision of 
food information to consumers, Brussels, 30.1 2008, COM 
(2008) 40 final, of January 30, 2008.
This proposal aims to bring together and modify general 
food law (Directive 2000/13/EC about labelling and 
packaging of foodstuffs as well as food advertising) and 
the nutritional labelling law (Directive 90/496/EEC of 
24 September 1990).
The proposal is partially based upon input from stake-
holders (government organs, consumer organisations, 
health associations, industry associations, and individu-
als).Nutritional Information
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The EC’s point of reference is the 
empowered consumer who desires 
information
With its proposal, the EU Commission once again 
favors information as a central instrument of con-
sumer policy. The special importance of this in-
strument is based on the reasoning that consumers, 
when fully informed, will behave in an economically 
rational way, thereby guaranteeing efficient markets 
and, in turn, increasing both individual and societal 
welfare. 
In addition, the Commission asserts that a structural 
knowledge deficit concerning the quality and char-
acteristics of products and services exists among 
consumers, placing food suppliers at an informa-
tional advantage (i.e., there are informational asym-
metries between manufacturers and consumers). 
Consumer policy, it is argued, must counterbalance 
these asymmetries. Moreover, the EU Commission 
starts from the premise of a fictive normal consumer, 
“who is normally informed, attentive, and knowl-
edgeable.” Thus, the EU Commission’s consumer 
policy is not based on empirically verifiable findings 
about the behavior of real consumers, but instead on 
the ideal of a homo oeconomicus,2 a concept that is 
also embedded in the legal outlook of the European 
Court: If consumers are provided with information, 
they will conduct themselves in a rational and em-
powered fashion in their economic decision-making 
processes. In other words: What the EC is saying 
is that consumers should act how we want them to 
from a normative perspective.
There is certainly much evidence to show that con-
sumers by no means behave rationally. As a result, 
the model of the perfectly rational consumer needs 
to be revised and adapted to reality. To provide a 
simple example, given the widespread incidence of 
overweight, it is hard to conclude that consumers 
primarily act in an (economically) rational way, 
consistently making prudent eating choices.
Color-coded or colorless; 
percentages or quantities?
Soon  the  European  Parliament  and  then  the 
European Council will come to a decision about 
an EU Commission directive and thus about a 
Europe-wide unified system of nutritional label-
ling for foodstuffs.3 It is a matter of contention as 
2  This took place in connection with Directive 84/450/EEC of the 
Council of 10 September 1984 on misleading and comparative adverti-
sing.
3  In March of this year the Committee on the Environment, Public 
to which system of nutritional labelling should be 
approved.4 Basically, there are two diametrically op-
posed models under debate, and, in addition, there is 
a compromise model. The EU Commission prefers 
the Guideline Daily Amount (GDA) model. The 
essential features of this model are: (1) nutritional 
content is shown as percentages of the daily rec-
ommended intake for each respective nutrient; and 
(2) no traffic light system or color coding is used 
to identify the nutrient levels in foods. This model 
is also referred to as expanded nutrition labelling 
or the “1 plus 4” model. In Germany, it is favored 
by the federal ministry for consumer protection as 
well as by the food industry and Food, Beverages, 
and Catering Union (NGG).5
The opposing model under consideration is the so-
called nutrition traffic light, which in addition to 
providing data on absolute nutrient quantities also 
designates every nutrient with the color red (i.e. 
high content), yellow (moderate content) or green 
(low content).6 This system is promoted by a wide 
range of consumers associations and health care 
organisations.7 The opposition parties in the German 
Bundestag also have expressed their support for the 
nutrition traffic light.8 
In contrast to the GDA model, the traffic light label 
uses a color-coded classification to highlight the 
relative levels of each nutrient. The similarities to a 
street traffic light are intentional: Red indicates the 
presence of an especially high amount of a nutrient 
in a product. Consumers get the message that, “for 
Health, and Food Safety (ENVI) recommended the GDA model to the 
European Parliament. Nevertheless, many member of the Committee 
indicated their preference for a hybrid model that combines the traffic 
light and GDA information. The Parliament is not bound to adopt the 
Committee’s recommendation. The Directive is supposed to define gene-
ral rules for displaying information, but stipulate a special system. The 
right of member states to use their own labelling standards is also to be 
preserved, provided these standards don‘t contravene EU rules.
4  The discussion in this regard is based on the debate between German 
proponents. Nevertheless, it largely reflects the EU debate.
5  See the Bund für Lebensmittelrecht und Lebensmittelkunde (BLL), 
Federation of German Food and Drink Industries (BVE), Federation of 
German Industries (BDI), and German Retail Federation (HDE), and Mar-
kenverband:  Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Ampeldiskussion—Fakten statt 
Populismus—Absage der Wirtschaft an die Kehrtwende in der Politik zur 
Nährwertkennzeichnung von Lebensmitteln. 29. May 2008. The German 
Food, Beverages, and Catering Union (NGG) fears that traffic light label-
ling could lead to job losses in its sector.
6  The German Nutrition Society (DGE) criticises the traffic light and 
GDA models: Stellungnahme der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Ernährung 
zur erweiterten Nährwertinformation auf der Basis des „1 plus 4“–Mo-
dells. On the subject of the GDA model, see the DGE statement titled 
Stellungnahme zur Anwendung von „Guideline Daily Amounts“ (GDA) in 
der freiwilligen Kennzeichnung von Lebensmitteln 2008.
7  Open letter from the Federation of German Consumer Organisations 
(Vzbv) of 1 Feb. 2010; VzBv of 7 May 2010: Letter to the German Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection (BMELV) concer-
ning the foodstuffs directive.
8  Press  release  of  the  SPD  Bundestag  fraction’s  Working  Group  on 
Nutrition, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection, 2009; Green party Bun-
destag fraction, 2009.144
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Does traffic light labelling patronise 
mature consumers?
Criticism has also been voiced that traffic light la-
belling interferes with the personal responsibility of 
consumers. Yet this contention overlooks the fact 
that the traffic light is merely a way to provide infor-
mation, and that the consumer is in no way forced to 
behave in a specific manner. Instead, the consumer 
is merely provided with the option of choosing a 
product based upon additional information.
Traffic light labelling is also criticised because it 
ostensibly discriminates against entire groups of 
foods that are especially flavorful, such as sweets. 
For this reason, it is said to be a political-ideological 
attempt to control demand. In fact, the purpose of 
nutritional labelling is to inform consumers about 
high levels of certain nutrients in a basic way that is 
independent of any specific system. The nutritional 
and health policy aim of labelling is ultimately to 
support the consumer in making health-conscious 
food choices. However, the consumer remains free 
to purchase foods that are considered unhealthy 
from a nutritional perspective. Thus, labelling repre-
sents a low level of regulatory intervention. It would 
be a different story altogether if indulgent foodstuffs 
were banned or saddled with a high tax. 
Does traffic light labelling lack a sold 
scientific basis?
Other critics have targeted the lack of a solid scien-
tific foundation for traffic light labelling. However, 
an evaluation of the existing body of research on nu-
tritional labelling shows that this criticism could be 
leveled against either system. Empirical research to 
date has provided very few hard facts to justify con-
clusions about which labelling system would have a 
measurable impact on nutritional behavior.10
Further points of contention
Apart from the core question—color-coding of 
nutrient values or GDA figures without classify-
ing colors—there are a series of additional points 
regarding the configuration of the labelling system 
that have been the subject of disagreement. These 
points also relate to the question under examination 
here about which kind of labelling would better 
contribute to the consumer and health policy objec-
tives of greater transparency and healthier eating 
behavior. 
10 In many countries there is simply a lack of practical examples. In ad-
dition, there are considerable problems of attribution. See Weekly Report 
20/2010.
this nutrient, there is a red warning signal, so think 
again about your consumption and avoid frequent 
consumption of this food.” The thresholds for red, 
yellow, and green are to be based on scientific cri-
teria from nutritional and health research. Finally, 
there is a compromise model, also designated as the 
hybrid model, in which the GDA data is shown as 
percentages but also emphasised with traffic light 
color codes (see Table). 
Is the traffic light system arbitrary in its 
valuation?
The opponents of traffic light labelling raise the 
criticism that it is based on subjective norms. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the traffic light may 
not lead to healthier food choices, since it does not 
differentiate sufficiently between healthy and un-
healthy foods. As a result, the traffic light model 
may discriminate against some products and may 
promote an unbalanced diet. The traffic light system 
also ignores foods that have more constituents than 
the few listed nutrients; evaluating single nutrients 
in the food, it is said, does not lead to a balanced diet. 
In this respect, opponents argue that the traffic light 
is not a suitable measure for combating overweight. 
In the traffic light system, green creates a false sense 
of security, and red wrongly suggests a food is bad. 
Low-calorie colas, for example, would receive a 
green light for all four nutrient categories, whereas 
fruit juices containing sugar would be marked as 
yellow or red. Because of their sugar or fat content, 
fruit, muesli, milk, and olive oil get a red light, 
although these foodstuffs provide nutrients that are 
necessary for life.
Proponents of the traffic light argue in turn that 
under this system, it is not the product but only the 
amount of each nutrient that is being judged, and that 
red does not mean the food is unhealthy across the 
board, but instead simply stands for a high content 
of that particular nutrient.9 Against the criticism of 
arbitrariness, the traffic light’s advocates argue that 
all products will be evaluated according to the same 
criteria. They also claim that the examples cited by 
opponents are poorly chosen: Thus, milk would not 
receive a single red light for any individual nutrient 
and because of its fat content, olive oil, like any 
other oil, would receive a red color only for this 
nutrient. 
 
9  See e.g. Food Watch: Die Vorwürfe der Industrie gegen die Ampel. 
2010,  http://foodwatch.de/kampagnen__themen/ampelkennzeich-
nung/10_argumente/index_ger.html.Nutritional Information
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Which nutrient values should be 
included: “1 plus 4” versus “4 plus 8”
Regarding the nutrient values that should be sub-
ject to mandatory labelling, the question revolves 
around which and how many dietary components 
should be required and where these figures should 
be positioned. The GDA model foresees labelling 
for four dietary components, the so-called big four—
sugar, salt, fat, and saturated fat. The food industry 
advocates only placing the calorie content on the 
Table 
Basic Models under Consideration for Nutritional Labelling Regulation
Percentage GDA Model Hybrid Model Traffic Light Labelling
MModel favored by:
European Union, German Federal Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection 
(BMELV), Confederation of the Food and Drink 
Industries of Europe (CIAA)
Calories plus 4 nutrient values with color-coding 
on the front side of packaging; non-classifying 
colors allowed.
Per portion (50 g)
Calories Sugar         Fat Sat.            Salt
  Fat
Percentage of recommended daily allowance
113kcal 10g 0.8g 0.3g 0.,3g
11% 6% 1% 2% 5%
Model favored by:
The Federation of German Consumer Organizations (VzBv) and 
others.1
Calories plus 4 nutrient values with traffic light colors for 
absolute amounts on the front side of the packaging.
Fat Sat. Fat Sugar Salt
Low Moderate High Low
7.7g 2.0g 42.2g 2.0g
Per 100g or per portion
Calories plus 4 nutrient values with traffic light colors 
for absolute amounts and daily percentages on the 
front of the packaging.
Each portion (half package) contains
Calories
Percentage of recommended daily allowance
353 0.9g 20.3g 10.8g 1.1g
18%
MODERATE
1% 29% 54% 18%
MODERATE MODERATE LOW HIGH
Sugar Fat Sat. Fat Salt
Selected Nutritional Information Systems Currently In Use
Multiple traffic light system in the UK
Nutritional values with traffic light colors; no 















A pilot project launched by the company FRoSTA; labeling used 
on four of the company’s most popular frozen dinners.
Total calories listed with color-coded nutrient values
All values in 100g:
Fat Sugar Salt Sat. Fat
Calories:112 kcal
1,2g 3,3g 0,7g 2,0g
Green = low amount / no cause for concern; yellow (here, light gray) = moderate amount / caution advised; red (here, dark gray) = high amount / use sparingly
1 Bundesverband der Allgemeinen Ortskrankenkassen (AOK), Berufsverband der Kinder- und Jungendärtze Deutschlands (BVKJ), German Medical Association, Deutsche Herzstif-
tung, diabetesDE, Gesetzliche Krankenversicherungen-Spitzenverband, and Foodwatch.
Sources: German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection (BMELV), Federation of 
German Consumer Organizations (VzBv), FSA, FRoSTA; figure by DIW. DIW Berlin 2010146
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Dossier 
Current status of nutritional and health policy
World Health Organization: Overweight is 
a global epidemic – Germany’s ranking is 
particularly bad
For some time now, overweight has been at the top of 
the list of significant public health problems. Globally, 
overweight and obesity rank among the fastest grow-
ing core health problems. The number of overweight 
persons has significantly increased in recent years in 
all highly developed nations and also in a large number 
of emerging nations. The proportion of the population 
that is obese has risen in all OECD member states during 
the past 30 years. 
Compared to the rest of Europe, Germany (along with the 
UK) has the highest proportion of overweight individu-
als in its population. In Germany, “…about one half of 
all men and a third of women over 18 years of age are 
overweight. An additional 17 percent of men and 20 
percent of women suffer from obesity …”1  
Nutrition and health research has demonstrated several 
connections between overweight and socio-economic 
characteristics. For example, overweight and obesity 
increase with age; a higher Body Mass Index (BMI)2 is 
associated with lower levels of schooling for both men 
and women; the BMI falls with rising net per capita in-
come; and the largest percentage of individuals who 
are seriously overweight belong to the lower economic 
classes.3  
Improper nutrition leads to overweight and 
results in an increased risk of illness
Health and nutrition research explains overweight and 
obesity as the products of genetic predisposition, fam-
ily-specific and obesity-promoting life circumstances, 
as well as behavioural patterns.4 Research has clearly 
proven that improper diet and exercise is a critical factor 
in individuals becoming overweight. The latest research 
also proceeds from the assumption that a close con-
nection exists between genetic factors and individual 
behavior. 
Research has also shown that overweight goes hand in 
hand with serious health risks. Of course, while health 
is dependent upon multiple determinants – including 
age, genetic predisposition, exercise, stress, environmen-
tal factors, and education – nutrition is also a critical 
factor. Thus, overweight and obese individuals have a 
considerably higher risk of illness than individuals of 
normal weight. This relationship is aggravated because 
overweight and obesity are frequently associated with 
a lack of physical exercise. 
front of the package, reasoning that this is the most 
relevant information for consumers. 
By contrast, consumer and health care organisations 
are in favor of placing the big-four dietary compo-
nents in full view on the front of the packaging. In 
an addition, total calories could be indicated. On the 
reverse side of the packaging, additional mandatory 
information should be included so that the big eight 
nutritional values are all listed (calories, protein, 
carbohydrates, sugar, fat, saturated fats, fiber, and 
sodium/salt). 
Percentage figures or amounts: “15 
percent fat” or “2 grams of fat?” 
The question whether a percentage figure or an 
amount should be shown for nutritional values is 
WHO Body Mass Index (BMI) – Classification for Adults
BMI (kg/m2) Associated Desease Risks
Underweight < 18.5 low, but the risk for other clinical problems are increased
Normal Weight 18.5 – < 25 average
Overweight ≥ 25 requiring treatment
Pre-obese  ≥ 25 – < 30 increased
Obese Class I ≥ 30 – < 35 moderat
Obese Class  II ≥ 35 – < 40 severe
Obese Class  III ≥ 40 very severe
Source: WHO 2000. DIW Berlin 2010Nutritional Information
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Overweight and obese individuals suffer an increased 
incidence of serious and chronic illnesses: cardiovascular 
diseases, high blood pressure, Type 2 diabetes, disorders 
of lipid metabolism, gout, back disorders, diseases of the 
musculoskeletal system, gall bladder disease, strokes and 
various types of cancer. 
Parental overweight is a significant factor 
for overweight in children
A study of child and adolescent health in Germany shows 
that around 15 percent of children and adolescents are 
overweight and about six percent are obese. Findings 
from these studies additionally show that in about half 
of these children and adolescents, at least one resultant 
illness was present (high blood pressure, disorders of lipid 
metabolism, Type 2 diabetes, or orthopedic complica-
tions).5 The most important determinant for overweight 
in children and adolescents was parental overweight; 
an additional significant factor is high media usage. 
Obesity also affects the entire life cycle. Pre-obese and 
obese mothers are likelier to have overweight babies 
than normal weight mothers, and their children then 
have a high risk of becoming obese adults. 
Improper nutrition results in high social 
costs
The increasing incidence of overweight and serious re-
sultant illness leads to health-care and social costs from, 
among other things, hospital stays, medications, an in-
ability to work, and higher research expenditures. In ad-
dition, there are significant social problems. Overweight 
is often accompanied by a reduction in the quality of 
life for overweight persons and for their families. It is 
estimated that about 30 percent of overall health care 
costs – equivalent to over 70 billion euros annually – 
are spent for illnesses that are partially mediated by 
diet.6 This does not include intangible costs that arise 
as a consequence of illnesses but cannot be assessed 
monetarily.
1  Robert  Koch  Institute,  German  Federal  Statistical  Office: 
Gesundheits  berichterstattung  des  Bundes:  Gesundheit  in  Deutsch-
land, 2006, pp. 113-114. Note that Germany’s poor performance may 
be partially due to the methodology employed. Thus, the findings for 
Germany and the UK are based upon objective measures, whereas 
the other countries use self-reported body weight and size. German 
Federal Ministry of Health: Gesunde Ernährung und Bewegung – Ein 





2 The Body Mass Index (BMI) is an indicator for overweight and obe-
sity defined by the WHO. The BMI is calculated in the following way: 
BMI = W/H2, where W is the body weight in kilograms and H is the 
height in meters. Other indicators for overweight and, in particular, 
for an increased risk profile for the heart and blood vessels (cardio-
vascular risks) are waist circumference and the waist-hip ratio, see 
Kleiser, C.: Determinants and Health Risks of Overweight and Obesity 
Among Children and Adolescents in Germany. Dissertation at the Uni-
versity of Bonn, Bonn 2009. 
3 Max Rubner Institute, German Federal Research Institute of Nu-
trition  and  Food  (MRI):  Die  Nationale  Verzehrsstudie  II:  Wie  sich 
die  Bürgerinnen  und  Bürger  in  Deutschland  ernähren.  This  study, 
commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Nutrition, Agriculture and 
Consumer Protection (BMELV 2008, see www.was-esse-ich.de/index.
php?id=74), serves as the basis for nutritional recommendations and 
consumer information.
4 German Nutrition Society (DGE):  Ernährungsbericht 2008, availa-
ble at www.dge.de/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=914.
5 Robert Koch Institute: Studie zur Gesundheit von Kindern und Ju-
gendlichen in Deutschland (KIGGS Study), available at www.kiggs.de.
6 Valid data are not available for the consequential costs of over-
weight, since illnesses in health reporting are not recorded statistical-
ly according to their causes. The costs provided in this report are only 
an estimate cited by the BMELV (German Federal Ministry for Nutriti-
on, Agriculture and Consumer Protection) and BMG (German Federal 
Ministry of Health) in Gesunde Ernährung und Bewegung – Schlüssel 
für mehr Lebensqualität. 2007, 2. These estimates are based upon a 
study by the BMG: Kosten von ernährungsabhän  gigen Krankheiten in 
der BRD im Jahre 1990. Volume 27, 1993. At that time, related costs 
were calculated to be 42.7 billion euros, as cited by the German Soci-
ety for Nutritional Medicine: Newsletter 1: Ernährungsmedizin heute. 
2005 and BMG: Daten und Fakten zu Ernährung und Bewegung Prä-
vention. The German Institute for Nutritional Medicine and Dietetics 
(D.I.E.T) calculated the data for 1990 as being just as high and came 
up with costs totaling 148.5 billion Deutschmarks for nutrition-rela-
ted illnesses in 2001.
another significant difference between the two mod-
els. The GDA model foresees indicating the recom-
mended daily allowance in percent along with the 
nutrient amount in grams. Supporters of a simplified 
traffic light label, by contrast, prefer only display-
ing weight data on the front of the package without 
any reference to recommended daily intake, argu-
ing that standard recommendations do not apply to 
all consumers equally and thus might mislead the 
consumer. The compromise, or hybrid, model would 
provide information on both grams and percentages 
and also highlight them with color-coding. 
Recommended daily values—but for 
whom? 
The GDA values for the intake of various nutri-
ents are based upon the recommendations of the 
Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of 
Europe (CIAA). Supporters of the traffic light model 148
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are critical of the GDA values and oppose using 
them as a basis for regulation, citing the fact that 
they were defined by the food industry itself. Some 
of the GDA values are lower than the respective 
values defined by the World Health Organization 
and the so-called D-A-CH standards jointly set by 
the German, Austrian, and Swiss national nutrition 
societies (see Figure).11 Critics of the GDA model 
also find fault with the fact that the reference values 
are based upon the nutritional needs of an average 
woman in terms of weight, health status, and physi-
cal activity. The same allowances are not applicable 
to many other consumers, including children, the 
elderly, those who are already overweight, and the 
chronically ill. 
Portion figures: per portion, per half-package, 
per 40 g, or per 100 g?
There is also controversy concerning whether in-
formation should be presented per 100 grams (for 
foodstuffs) and 100 milliliters (for liquid products) 
or related to the standard portion size of the particu-
lar product. Industry groups would prefer to dis-
play the information per portion. The food industry 
considers data presented in 100-gram amounts as 
something to be avoided, for in many cases, smaller 
portions are actually eaten. The advocates of traffic 
light labelling instead favor a mandated, uniform 
reference standard of 100 grams or 100 milliliters. 
Manufacturers would be free to provide additional 
per portion data as long as it were defined in a way 
that is consistent for every product and uniform 
among suppliers of the same product group. In ad-
dition, manufacturers would be required to state 
the portion amount in clear relation to the package 
contents. This could be fulfilled with a statement 
that, “A portion consists of half the package” or by 
packaging the product according to portions. 
Could behavioural and information 
economics provide additional help?
As presented in the foregoing, the specific configu-
ration of future nutritional labelling is a matter of in-
tense controversy. There are no unequivocal empiri-
cal data available as of yet that would prove beyond 
a doubt which of the debated systems would have 
a measurable impact on eating behavior. However, 
the insights offered by information and behavioural 
economics can be of significant assistance in the 
formulation of policy, as will be shown below. 
11 For example, the industry guideline allowance for sugar is 90 grams 
per day, whereas the WHO allowance is 60 grams per day. For the D-A-CH 
guidelines, see www.dge.de/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid
=920.
The complexity of purchasing and eating behavior 
raises questions about how people are able to absorb 
and process complex information. What hampers 
and what facilitates information absorption and 
processing? What behavioural mechanisms and 
strategies do people develop and how can these 
mechanisms be influenced? The fields of informa-
tion and behavioural economics offer insights in 
this regard that are supported by many experimental 
studies. 
Consumers have information deficits 
and cannot accurately judge food 
quality 
Starting from the assumption that product quality 
governs product selection, information economics 
distinguishes between different qualities of products 
according to how clearly and at which point in time 
these product characteristics become recognisable to 
consumers. In this regard, foods are basically seen 
as search goods, since most often, their quality is 
already known to some degree of certainty at the 
time of purchase, and at the latest by the time of 
consumption.12
Yet foodstuffs also increasingly demonstrate char-
acteristics of “experience” and “credence” goods. 
In the case of such goods, quality can scarcely be 
known or not known at all. This applies, for instance, 
to nutrient levels in foodstuffs. To provide an exam-
12 We are speaking in this case of the definition of goods in transactio-
nal economics. In the case of experience goods, the quality is first dis-
cernable through experience and learning after purchase (i.e. a visit to a 
restaurant). In addition, there are also credence goods, for which it is not 
possible to determine quality even after purchase (i.e. medications), see 
Nelson, M. P.: Information and Consumer Behavior. In: Journal of Political 
Economics 78, 1970, pp. 311–329; Hagen, K., L. A. Reisch: Riesterrente: 
Politik ohne Marktbeobachtung. DIW Wochenbericht 8/2010.
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ple: while a consumer might suffer negative long-
term effects from the excessive consumption of satu-
rated fatty acids, in the absence of the information on 
the fat content of foods, he or she cannot recognise 
the link to these negative effects.13 Figuring out 
which foods and which dietary practices are healthy 
places a significant burden upon the competency 
of consumers.14 Consumer information—such as 
nutritional labelling—aims to increase transparency 
about quality and to correct the structural knowledge 
deficits of consumers. Consumer uncertainty about 
the quality and the benefits of different foods is 
aggravated by the fact that both nutritional science 
and the media often report equivocal or contradic-
tory findings.15 
Finally, not all consumers are actively interested 
in health and nutrition. Thus there will always be 
consumers who are consciously or unconsciously 
closed off to new information, whether for reasons 
of time, lack of awareness, insufficient education, 
or from the emotional need to overlook their own 
ignorance. In addition, some people may have ab-
solute cognitive limitations that limit their capacity 
to assimilate new information.16 
Consumers do not make rational 
decisions: Short-term impulses trump 
long-term goals 
Why do people eat more than is good for them? 
Why do they buy foods whose consumption, at least 
in large amounts and over long periods of time, 
is not beneficial for them? Behavioural econom-
ics explains that in their purchasing and eating 
decisions, people systematically deviate from the 
kind of rational economic behavior postulated by 
neoclassical explanatory models. Indeed, in many 
instances, consumers behave in a systematically 
irrational way.17
13 Caswell, J. A., D. I. Padberg: Toward a More Comprehensive Theory 
of Food Labels. In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 74, 
No. 2, 1992, pp. 460–468. The labelling of goods is a policy instrument 
for addressing informational uncertainties faced by the consumer. This 
can take place in various forms for various product characteristics. It can 
also be regulated by the government or occur voluntarily by the manuf-
acturer.
14 For more on promoting the ability of consumers to make good de-
cisions, see Piorkowsky, M.-B. et al.: Verbraucherkompetenz für einen 
persönlich erfolgreichen und gesellschaftlich verantwortlichen Konsum. 
Statement of the Scientific Council for the German Federal Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection (BMELV), 2008.
15 Virtually all of us have read at least once that the consumption of 
fruit can help to prevent illnesses such as cancer. Yet articles that questi-
on this conclusion are also not uncommon.
16 Most people can absorb and process a 7 +/-2 „information chunks,“ 
see Miller, G.: The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Li-
mits on Our Capacity for Processing Information. In: Psychological Review 
63, 1956, pp. 81–97.
17 For a detailed account of the various anomalies, see Hagen, K., L.A. 
Reisch, ibid., 6.
According to behavioural studies, in the search 
phase of purchasing (thus, prior to the actual pur-
chase) at least three anomalies can arise, includ-
ing (1) selective perception; (2) decisions based 
upon past experiences; and (3) conclusions based 
on the way information is presented (also known as 
framing effects). The moment of purchase is itself 
influenced by several anomalies. These include the 
source effect; the anchoring bias (i.e. when informa-
tion presented early on is weighted more heavily 
than the rest); the overestimation and underestima-
tion of one’s own behavior; excessive self-certainty 
regarding one’s own judgment based upon a single 
chance success; and, finally, a similar, systematic 
misestimation of risks.18 Further anomalies relate to 
herd behavior, which refers to peer pressure from 
family and friends.19
Behavioural economics has demonstrated that the 
environment where decisions are made has a large 
impact upon decision behavior. Examples of this 
are foods that are seductive based upon their shelf 
position, their packaging, or their rapid accessibility 
(such as frozen dinners).20 The majority of prefer-
ences are first formed at the moment of a purchase 
decision, which indicates that there is a significant 
potential to influence the consumer.21 
In addition, people would rather make decisions 
based on short-term impulses rather than long-term 
goals. In this regard, behavioural economics speaks 
of hyperbolic discounting, meaning that consum-
ers easily discount the future in the interests of the 
here and now.22 Thus, the negative consequences of 
consuming excessive carbohydrates are often subtle 
and only become manifest years later (e.g. when one 
contracts diabetes). By contrast, short-term need-
18 One example of a behavioural anomaly that occurs systematically is 
the tendency to put off changes in behavior that are perceived as disa-
dvantageous or limiting. This is a form of distorted mental bookkeeping. 
For example, the thought “eat too much today” is cancelled out by “eat 
less tomorrow” – the actual limitation of behavior is then put off with 
each passing day. The Eurobarometer shows that very few people are risk 
conscious when they go food shopping, see www.eufic.org/jpage/de/
page/JSURVEY/surid/2.
19 Baumeister, R. F., E. A. Sparks, T. F. Stillman, K. D. Vohs: Free will in 
consumer behavior: Self-control, ego depletion, and choice. In: Journal of 
Consumer Psychology 18, 2008, pp. 4–13.
20 Product  manufacturers  have  exploited  these  phenomena  in  their 
advertising for many years: see e.g. Warmbier, W. Der programmierte 
Kunde: Neuromarketing – Frontalangriff auf unsere Sinne. 2008.
21 The majority of preferences are constructive, as they are first formed 
at the time of purchase. Such preferences are dependant on the context, 
can change quickly, and are easy to manipulate. The placement and pre-
sentation of a product plays a major role in which product will be chosen. 
A difference is drawn between such preferences and so-called inherent 
preferences  that  are  independent  from  the  decision-making  context, 
stable over the long term, based on that which has been learned, and 
are partially explained by genetic disposition.  The relative influence of 
constructive and inherent preferences is a matter of ongoing debate.
22 Benabou, G. S., J. Tirole: Willpower and Personal Rules. In: Journal of 
Political Economy 112(4), 2004, pp. 848–886.150
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fulfillment typically generates significantly stronger 
behavioural impulses. 
Of course, consumers employ their own personal 
strategies to combat their irrationality, such as self-
control. Educated and health-conscious consumers 
may react to a loss of control by imposing mecha-
nisms of self-restraint, e.g. by joining a nutritional 
counseling group.23 A major factor in changing con-
sumer behavior is for rewards and punishments to 
become clearly associated with the act of eating. 
This may help consumers to overcome present-
biased preferences (such as the need for sweets).24 
An element that is especially problematic from the 
perspective of behavioural economics is the repeti-
tive experience of mistaken purchasing decisions. 
This occurs when consumers realise that they have 
not acted in accordance with their own rational, 
long-term behavioural preferences (for example, by 
neglecting fat content). Such experiences of failure 
decrease self-confidence and the capacity for self-
control, and over multiple repetitions can turn into 
a self-fulfilling prophecy.25
From the observations described above, behavioural 
economics would draw the conclusion that addi-
tional information would only have a limited effect 
on decision-making or self-control. Behavioural 
economics differentiates between reflective, rational 
action on the one hand and intuitive, learned patterns 
of thought and choice on the other—in the latter 
case, people are especially resistant to new informa-
tion. In the purchase of foodstuffs, it is clear that 
people often act intuitively and based on habit.
What would behavioural economics 
recommend? 
With regard to the practical problems of com-
municating information, behavioural economics 
would conclude that a great deal depends on how 
governmental nutritional-labelling regulations are 
ultimately conceived. Experts in the field of behav-
ioural economics suggest that you should provide 
23 For example, when on a Weight Watchers diet, participants must 
adhere to strict eating plan, and eating behavior is monitored and con-
trolled by regular weighing, group support, and reward mechanisms.
24 Thaler, R. H., S. Benartzi: Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioural 
Economics to Increase Employee Saving. In: Journal of Political Economy, 
112(1), 2004, pp. 164–187. A current US study shows that individuals 
who want to reduce their weight and who have strong present-biased 
preferences are less frequently successful at dieting than individuals who 
have weaker present-biased preferences. Another mechanism – so-called 
mental editing, i.e. the modification of memories – is at work here. It is a 
strategy for protecting the psyche and ensures that internal reputation 
mechanisms are not undermined or become ineffective.
25 Kim, J. Y.: Hyperbolic discounting and the repeated self-control pro-
blem. In: Journal of Economic Psychology 27, 2006, pp. 344–359.
information in a simple but emphatic way in order 
to achieve a desired behavioural change.26
Behavioural economics states that in order to help 
pave the way for individuals to pursue their best 
self-interests and the good of the entire society, 
goals must remain transparent and the individual 
must always retain the option of opting out of the 
government measure (i.e. we should pursue a form 
of soft paternalism). From this perspective, it is 
impossible to say with certainty which system of 
nutritional labelling is preferable. However, ex-
perts in behavioural research would likelier prefer 
a colored traffic light over the colorless dietary data 
because traffic lights have a greater signaling effect 
and they communicate a simple, easily understand-
able message.
Conclusions
Health data show that eating behavior in Germany 
is not satisfactory. It is essential to expand public 
understanding of nutrition and health, and it is of 
greatest priority to improve eating behavior given 
the high social costs of overweight and bad nutrition. 
The mandatory labelling of nutrient levels should 
help consumers to become better informed about 
the quality of foodstuffs and to make more health-
conscious purchases. 
In the contentious debate between the GDA and 
traffic-light models, it should first be emphasised 
that the GDA model more strongly emphasises sup-
plier freedom of choice, competition, and nutritional 
education. By contrast, the traffic light model pri-
marily underscores the consumer policy goal of pre-
venting consumers from being misled. In addition, 
it embodies the health policy goal of promoting a 
more health-conscious choice of foodstuffs.
Some experts are forcefully opposed to a color-
coded scheme for nutrient value information. They 
argue that traffic light labelling does not provide 
consumers with any clear buying strategy, and would 
instead tend to promote conflicted decisions. They 
argue that foodstuffs might end up simultaneously 
displaying red, yellow and green lights. However, 
this ambiguity is also true of the GDA system.
Other experts suggest that the battle about symbols 
and colors is ultimately irrelevant, since there are 
26 Cutler, D. M., E. L. Glaeser, J. M. Shapiro: Why Have Americans Be-
come More Obese? In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3), 2003, pp. 
93–118; Sunstein, C. R., R. H. Thaler: Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron. In: 
The University of Chicago Law Review 70(4), Fall 2003, pp. 1159–1202; 
Sunstein, C. R., R. H. Thaler: Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
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many causes of unhealthy lifestyles and overweight and the graphic configuration 
of nutritional labels will certainly not have any negative effects upon consumers. 
Consumer associations and health care organisations do not share this estimation. 
They explicitly advocate the traffic light system.
Existing studies cannot provide an unequivocal conclusion about whether the 
GDA data or the traffic light system would be better at promoting health-conscious 
purchasing and diet decisions by consumers. Neither model has a clear advantage 
over the other on this basis. For this reason, in pursuing of a policy decision, it is 
especially important to consider the insights of behavioural economics. In light of 
the findings of behavioural economics concerning the actions of real people, policy 
makers should give preference to a color-coded presentation of nutrient level data 
and to absolute amounts versus percentage figures. This is especially true if con-
sumer and health policy wishes to also reach naive and poorly educated consumers, 
and those without an active interest in health. Traffic light labelling sends a clear 
behavioural signal—and precisely this is of key concern in the consumer and health 
policy reasoning that is cited for the reform of food labelling.
(First published as “Nährwertkennzeichnung: Die Ampel erreicht die Verbraucher am 
besten”, in: Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin Nr. 22/2010.) 